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Abstract
The question of how to eﬀectively manage items with heterogeneous attributes and
diﬀering service requirements has become increasingly important to supply chains that
support the delivery of after sales service. However, there has been little investigation to
date on how organizations actually manage inventory levels under such circumstances.
This study provides such an investigation, focusing on the logistic system used to
manage consumable service parts for weapon systems in the U.S. military. Our ﬁndings,
based on interviews and rigorous analysis of part attribute and performance data,
suggest that in practice a part’s service level is negatively aﬀected by an item’s cost
and is less aﬀected by attributes such as its priority code. We introduce a simple
inventory model to explain our empirical ﬁndings and explore how variations in item
attributes can interact with an inventory policy to aﬀect system performance. Based
on this model, we recommend using explicit service level targets for priority categories
to achieve performance consistent with part priority. We show, using military data,
that a service diﬀerentiation strategy can be an eﬀective way of allocating inventory
investment by providing higher service for critical parts at the expense of accepting
lower service levels for parts with less importance.

1

Introduction

The delivery of diﬀerentiated levels of service to disparate classes of customers is an increasingly important requirement in today’s “customer centric” environment. In this context,
the fundamental challenge for supply chain managers is to support the need for customized
service while still exploiting the cost savings inherent in scale economies and risk pooling
opportunities within their supply chain networks. A case in point is the U.S. military, which
recently moved the management of consumable service parts for weapon systems from the
individual services (i.e., Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines) to the central Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA). This new arrangement oﬀers an opportunity to allocate inventory expenditure more eﬃciently by taking advantage of economies of scale in ordering and inventory
pooling. However, developing a system to accommodate such a wide range of parts for a
diverse customer base is a diﬃcult undertaking. The complexity of real environments makes
it diﬃcult to gauge how policy characteristics, such as budget constraints, service targets,
and priority codes, will play oﬀ each other.
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Our goals in this paper are (1) to provide insight into the conﬂicts that can arise when
balancing service diﬀerentiation and cost containment in a real, complex, logistics environment and (2) to deﬁne and test ways to reduce these conﬂicts. We do this through a series of
data analysis and descriptive modeling drawn from an empirical study of the U.S. military’s
service parts logistics system. While our analysis draws from the military environment,
the lessons learned apply to any company struggling to manage product inventories with
heterogeneous attributes and diverse customer service requirements.
We begin by analyzing how part attributes aﬀect actual performance (i.e., ﬁll rate and
response time) in practice. In particular, we perform a statistical study to test the relationship between part attributes and performance under DLA’s current logistics system. The
study highlights the role of criticality and essentiality codes used by the military to indicate
a service part’s importance to the mission. The objective behind this classiﬁcation is to
provide tailored response time and service targets for parts within each priority category.
However, we ﬁnd that after controlling for other part attributes, a part’s essentiality and
criticality are not signiﬁcant drivers of performance. Instead, cost appears to be the dominant performance driver. Our study appears to be the ﬁrst to quantify this management
problem, which may arise in any complex inventory system that serves multiple customer
classes under severe budget constraints.
Based on interaction with DLA, we provide a simple inventory model to explain our
empirical ﬁndings. Our model shows that if aggregate service level constraints are used in
inventory investment allocation decisions, major emphasis may be placed on certain part
attributes, such as cost, while other attributes, such as criticality and essentiality may be
de-emphasized. We oﬀer some simple remedies for dealing with this problem, including
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developing explicit service targets for diﬀerent categories of parts. We illustrate the potential
beneﬁts of this idea with an inventory model, using data drawn from DLA. The results
suggest that diﬀerentiated service requirements can be met without a signiﬁcant increase in
inventory costs for reasonable ranges of service diﬀerentiation.
These ﬁndings provide important managerial insights for companies trying to consolidate
their inventory management across diﬀerent product divisions, customer groups or part categories. A key challenge in trying to implement such a policy lies in the ability of the logistics
system to provide diﬀerentiated service across customer segments in a cost eﬀective fashion.
An important conclusion of our study is that explicit service level targets should be used for
the diﬀerent priority categories, so as to align service level with a part’s importance. Service
diﬀerentiation strategies can be an eﬀective way of utilizing inventory investment because
they provide higher service for the more important parts at the expense of accepting lower
service levels for parts with less impact. Category speciﬁc service targets also provide a
means for controlling for variation in other attributes (such as cost) for any given part population. Finally, this study suggests new opportunities for analytical research in rationing
and incentive issues in service diﬀerentiation, as highlighted in the conclusion section and
considered in our follow-on research.
As in previous empirical studies of inventory systems (e.g., Cohen and Lee 1988, Cohen
and Zhang 1997, and Lee and Billington 1993), our research focuses on describing what is
currently being done and then oﬀers lessons for other companies based on these observations. Our observations are statistically grounded rather than anecdotal since we had access
to a large database of part and performance measures. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that service
diﬀerentiated classes of service parts can be used to meet customer needs while containing
3

costs. This idea builds on the work of Cohen and Lee (1990) who studied two service part
management systems; one used by a computer ﬁrm and the other by an automobile manufacturer. They highlight the necessity to group parts based on their “essentiality” and to
use a diﬀerent service requirement for each category.
There has been a wide stream of literature on service parts logistics dating back thirty
years. Sherbrooke (1968) developed the well-known METRIC (Multi-Echelon Technique for
Recoverable Item Control) model for management of repairable items. This seminal work
generated a whole new research area in multi-echelon inventory control as illustrated by
the works of Simon (1971), Deuermeyer and Schwarz (1981), Graves (1985), Cohen et al.
(1986, 1988, 1989, and 1990), Lee (1987), Cohen, Kleindorfer and Lee (1988) and Wang,
Cohen and Zheng (1999, 2000, and 2001). A recent paper by Rustenburg et al. (2000)
analyzes spares parts management for technical systems under budget constraints, similar
to the environment studied here. The beneﬁts of using these techniques are enormous, as
illustrated by Muckstatdt and Thomas (1980) and Cohen et al. (1990). However, most of
the analytical research on service part management systems focuses on determining optimal
inventory levels for given inventory holding costs and target service rates. Most of this
literature is silent on how target service levels are actually set in practice. Our study sheds
light on this issue by explicitly considering the impact of part attributes on observed service
measures in a real service parts management system.
In the next section we describe the current military service parts logistics system in more
detail. Section 3 then outlines and tests a series of hypotheses concerning the drivers of
performance for this system. In section 4, we oﬀer a descriptive inventory model whose
drivers are consistent with our empirical results. We use this model to illustrate how explicit
4

service level constraints for diﬀerent demand classes can help to eﬀectively allocate inventory
in light of a budget constraint. Finally, in section 5, we outline what lessons our study
oﬀers other organizations who are contemplating consolidating their inventory management
services.

2

Process Description

The U.S. military’s logistics system stocks and services hundreds of thousands of consumable
service parts to support a worldwide installed base of weapon systems. The overall investment in these parts exceeds $10 billion. While our study focuses on consumable parts, it is
worth noting that weapon systems are supported by a combination of repairable and consumable service parts. The systems used to support repairable parts are quite complex and,
for the most part, still reside within the individual military services. The logistics system
for consumable parts, in contrast, is now centrally controlled through the Defense Logistics
Agency (DLA).

2.1

Demand Lifecycle

The demand for consumable parts comes directly from customers on ships, aircraft, or other
military equipment. This demand is driven both by initial deployments to support system
rollout as well as requests for replacement parts generated by failures in the ﬁeld. Weapon
systems typically are assemblies of both consumable and repairable items at various levels
of indenture. Examples include a 5” 54 mounted gun and a CIWS (i.e., Close-in-WeaponSystems, which are automated ﬁring systems used on ships to hit close range targets). Bombs
and rockets are not weapon systems, but rather munitions.
Figure 1 illustrates the life cycle of a typical weapon system. The decision to introduce
5

Figure 1: Weapon System Life Cycle

a weapon system is made at time point 1. Planning for the support of the weapon system
begins at this stage. After about one to two years, the production of the system and its
parts begin. At time point 3, the provisioning for the system begins and inventory targets
are tentatively set throughout the supply chain. At time point 4, which is about three to
ﬁve years from time point 1, weapon system introduction begins. The active life of a weapon
system is typically ﬁfteen to twenty years, with production support ending about three to
ﬁve years before the system is retired. Thus there is a demand ramp-up stage when the
system is being introduced, followed by a stable active life stage, and ﬁnally a phase out
stage between time points 6 and 7. In our analysis, we focus on DLA’s stocking decisions
for consumable service parts during the active life of a weapon system (i.e., between time
points 4 and 6).
6

Figure 2: Service Parts Logistics System

2.2

Supply Chain Structure

Figure 2 provides an overview of the supply chain structure for consumable parts supporting active weapon systems (see Cohen et al. 1998 for more details). DLA manages order
requests directly from end customers within each military service. However, each military
service also has a central advisory group within its organization which serves as an information intermediary between DLA and its customers within that service. We refer to these
advisory groups as ICPs since each functions within the respective service’s Inventory Control Point (ICP). Each ICP is responsible for providing DLA with demand forecasts and
order recommendations for their respective client base.
Most consumable service parts are stocked at two levels, referred to as retail and wholesale. Recommended inventory targets at both levels are typically determined by procedures
based on Sherbrooke’s METRIC model. Retail inventories are located at the ﬁnal customer
sites (i.e., on ships and at bases in the ﬁeld). Once retail inventory targets are established
7

for these sites, replenishments are managed according to a basestock policy (i.e., orders are
placed to maintain the target inventory level).
Wholesale inventories, which support multiple systems for multiple retail customers at
multiple stocking locations, are also typically replenished using a base stock policy. However, determining appropriate stocking targets at the wholesale level requires more complex
procedures to consolidate demand and service requirements across systems, customers and
locations while meeting aggregate budget constraints. DLA currently allocates inventory
investments at the wholesale level to balance two conﬂicting goals: minimizing holding and
investment costs while maximizing mission readiness. This trade-oﬀ is made more complex
by the fact that parts diﬀer in how important they are in supporting readiness. A part’s
importance is measured by two dimensions: 1) its essentiality to the operation of the weapon
system in which it is housed, and 2) the criticality of that system to the customer’s overall
mission.
A part is assigned one of four essentiality Codes depending on whether failure of the
part renders the weapon system inoperable (very high), aﬀects personnel safety (high), degrades the operational eﬀectiveness of the weapon system (but does not render inoperable)
(medium), or does not aﬀect the operation of the weapon system (low). The part is then
assigned a criticality Code based on the importance of its system application (high, medium,
or low). Together these codes dictate the Weapon System Indicator Code (WSIC) for a part,
see Table 1. These codes are assigned by each ICP and passed on to DLA with the implicit
assumption that DLA will provide better service (i.e., higher ﬁll rates and shorter response
time) for parts with higher WSIC values.
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Part Essentiality Code

Very High High Medium
(VH)
(H)
(M)

Mission Criticality Code
High (H)
Medium (M)
Low (L)

A
E
I

B
F
J

C
G
K

Low
(L)
D
H
L

Table 1: Weapon System Indicator Codes (A-L)

DLA develops its own policy for setting stocking targets, and for allocating inventory
investments, across parts at the wholesale level. The entire process for wholesale stock
level planning is iterative, beginning with recommendations received by DLA from the four
military services via their ICPs. These order recommendations are based on METRIC model
results and managerial input, inﬂuenced by each part’s estimated failure rate, service speciﬁc
WSIC classiﬁcation, system population, costs and other factors. DLA aggregates these order
recommendations across the four services and modiﬁes them based on its own budget, service,
and minimum order quantity constraints. These decisions are complicated by the fact that
diﬀerent ICP’s may have diﬀerent essentiality and criticality classiﬁcations for a common
part. In such cases DLA uses a “round-up” policy in which DLA assigns the highest WSIC
code reported for a part by the multiple users. This issue and its managerial implications are
analyzed, in depth, in a companion paper (Deshpande et al. 2001). DLA’s primary service
criteria is an aggregate ﬁll rate target, currently set (arbitrarily) at 90%. The ﬁnal wholesale
stocking targets reﬂect a compromise between the ICPs and DLA, and are often lower than
that suggested by the ICPs.
Because of the complex interaction between the ICPs and DLA, it is diﬃcult to predict
the impact of part characteristics (such as cost, essentiality, criticality, etc.) on performance.
During our interviews with members from the Navy and the DLA, for example, we discovered
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that members diﬀered in their perception about which factors actually or should aﬀect
performance based on their individual experience. Since DLA operates under an aggregate
ﬁll rate target and overall budget constraint, it is possible that they are not adequately
incorporating criticality and essentiality measures in their wholesale stocking decisions. It
is important to point out that during the period of our study, the Department of Defense
(DOD) was in the midst of downsizing. For DLA, this meant that the annual appropriation
for parts replenishment was based on a fraction of the previous year’s consumption. This
drives total inventory investment down and as a result the current budget allocation would be
based on what they were unable to sell in the previous budget period. This made investments
in slow moving, expensive inventory particularly unattractive. On the other hand, since all
ICPs focus on their own service priorities and do not face the overall budget constraint
imposed on DLA, it is possible that their order recommendations put too much emphasis on
criticality and essentiality. Given these conﬂicting views, it is unclear how cost, criticality,
and essentiality will be accounted for in the ﬁnal wholesale level stocking problem.
In the next section, we compare part attribute information with actual performance data
at the wholesale level to analyze the relationship between attributes and performance derived
from DLA’s stocking decisions. We use a statistical regression model to rigorously analyze
the data in an unbiased fashion to identify which part characteristics, if any, actually aﬀect
performance.

3

Empirical Findings: The Drivers of Performance

Service parts performance within DLA is measured in two ways: ﬁll rate and logistics response time (as deﬁned in Table 2).
10

Performance Measures

Variable Name

Description

Fill Rate

FR

The percentage of customer requests ﬁlled from stock,
for a given part. This was computed as a summary
statistic using transaction data (for data sets 2 and 3).

Logistics Response Time

LRT

The time needed to fulﬁll a customer request for a
part, from the time of the initial request to the time
of receipt. This was captured both as a yearly average
(in data set 1) and by transaction (in data sets 2 and 3).

ICP Processing Time

ISPT

Time taken by ICP to process a transaction
(a component of LRT).

Table 2: Part-Speciﬁc Performance Measures

Based on our interviews with representatives from DLA and the Navy ICP, we identiﬁed ten
potential drivers of these performance dimensions (see Table 3). In this section, we test the
signiﬁcance of these candidate drivers. We focus special attention on two candidates, part
essentiality and weapon criticality, since they are viewed as the most relevant service level
criteria in the eyes of the end customer (based on input from Navy ICP).

3.1

Data Collection and Preliminary Analysis

Figure 3 gives an overview of the data sets collected for this study and the timing of our
analysis. Our initial study examined part-speciﬁc attributes for twenty-eight weapon systems. These data are referred to as Data Set 1 in Figure 3. We collected data on all associated service parts managed by DLA, resulting in a total of 280,000 parts. Time-dependent
part attributes (e.g., demand frequency, average demand quantity) reﬂected annual part
activity between the ﬁrst quarters of 1995 and 1996. In addition to the candidate drivers
11

Part Attribute

Variable Name

Standard Unit Price

SUP

Description
The price DLA charges its customers, which
is a ﬁxed percentage markup over cost.

Essentiality Code

ES

The essentiality of the part to the performance
of the weapon system. Four categories are
possible, as illustrated in Table 1.

Weapon Criticality
Code

WC

The criticality of the weapon system to the
success of the mission. Three values are
possible, as illustrated in Table 1.

Administrative
Lead Time

ALT

The expected/planned administrative processing
time required for processing replenishment
orders. (A constant time for a given part).

Production
Lead Time

PLT

The expected/planned lead time faced by
DLA for its replenishment orders from its
suppliers. (A constant time for a given part).

Part Commonality

PC

The number of weapon systems containing
the part.

Annual Demand

AD

The total number of units requested (across
all customer requests) in a year.

Annual Demand Frequency

DF

The number of customer requests for a part
in a year (where the quantity of the order
may vary widely by request).

Acquisition Code J

AJ

Implies the part is non-stocked and centrally
acquired.

Acquisition Code Z

AZ

Implies that the part is an insurance item∗ .

∗

Items that are generally not subject to periodic replacement but subject to replacement
as the result of accidents or other unexpected occurences.

Table 3: Candidate Performance Drivers
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Figure 3: Flow Chart for Data Analysis

outlined in Table 3, we also collected an average logistics response time (LRT) measure for
each part that served as a summary performance measure for this time period. The purpose
of this initial study was to characterize the general population of service parts for naval
weapon systems and help identify a representative subset of weapon systems to use for the
transaction-speciﬁc data set.
This population of service parts contained a wide range of demand frequencies and standard unit prices. Many parts (42%) displayed no demand activity over the twelve-month
sample. The majority of parts (70%) had demand frequency of four or fewer in this period.
Demand frequency averaged 12 with a standard deviation of 72. Annual demand quantity
(total number of items requested for all issues) was also low, averaging 613 units with 64% of
parts displaying demand of 10 units or fewer. We observed that high demand parts tended
to be less expensive. Administrative lead times varied from zero days to almost one year,
with 73% having a lead time of 100 or fewer days. Production lead times are generally longer
13

than administrative lead times, with some as long as two years. The complicated production
process for complex weapon systems, combined with the thorough supplier qualiﬁcation and
contract award process, often leads to such large lead times.
Based on this preliminary analysis, we selected a representative subset of twenty-one
weapon systems from the original set of twenty-six. Our criteria for selection, based on
input from the Navy ICP, included:
1. Maximize the diversity of weapon system attributes, such as Mission Criticality, Life
Cycle (age), Population Density, Complexity (number of parts) and System Type (i.e.,
Ships, Surface Warfare, and Aviation).
2. Maintain a similar distribution of part attributes as seen in the larger weapon system
population.
3. Reduce the number of parts by at least 30% subject to criteria 1 and 2, limiting the
total number of parts to fewer than 200,000. (Note: Nav ICP recommended this speciﬁc
criteria as a way to control the size of our transaction-based data collection. They felt
that collecting and transmitting transaction-based data for more than 200,000 parts
would be extremely diﬃcult given the one to many mapping between a part and its
transactions.)
In order to satisfy criteria 1 and 2, we omitted ﬁve weapon systems. This resulted in a 38
percent reduction in parts, satisfying criteria 3. Table 4 illustrates how the two data sets vary
with respect to ﬁve key part-speciﬁc attributes. The two sets are nearly identical in terms
of cost and average production and administrative lead times. The reduced set displays a
slightly higher average demand frequency as well as a higher proportion of essential parts (i.e.,
14

parts having ’Very High’ essentiality, see Table 1 for terminology). Since we are particularly
interested in the performance of critical parts, having a higher proportion of such parts was
not seen as an issue. The ﬁve removed weapon systems were, for the most part, either new or
no longer supported. Parts for these systems, therefore, exhibited a lower demand frequency,
on average.
Production
Lead Time
Mean, Std

Admin.
Lead Time
Mean, Std

Demand
Frequency
Mean, Std

Standard
Unit Price
Mean, Std

Essent.
% of ‘VH’
Parts

Original
data

174, 100

91, 51

12, 72

227.2, 256

26%

Reduced
Data

173, 102

92, 51

16, 86

242.5, 314

33%

The original data set of 26 weapon systems consisted of 276,000 unique parts.
The reduced data set of 21 Weapon Systems consists of 170,959 unique parts,
a reduction of 38%.

Table 4: Comparison of Part Attributes

Next, we collected transaction data for parts corresponding to this reduced list of twentyone weapon systems. These transaction-based data are referred to as Data Set 2 in Figure 3.
We tracked a total of 113,805 transactions over a period of ﬁve months, starting with the
ﬁrst quarter of 1996. Of the 170,959 parts contained in the reduced part set only 31,000
(18%) displayed demand activity over this period. As mentioned earlier, the key performance
measures collected include Fill Rate (FR) and Logistics Response Time (LRT), see Table 2.
After analyzing this data set, the project team concluded that a larger data set, covering
a more current time period, was required. Additional transaction data consisting of 478,921
transactions over the period August 1996 to January 1997 was then collected. These data
15

Standard
Unit Price ($)
Fill Rate
Average LRT
No. of
Transactions
No. of
Parts

Very Low (VL)
[$0,$150]
95.7%
26.3 days
156650
(32.71%)
33838
(19.8%)

Low (L)
[$150,$500]
93.1%
29.0 days
86372
(18.03%)
25122
(14.7%)

Medium (M)
[$500,$1000]
89.2%
33.7 days
168436
(35.17%)
69726
(40.8%)

High (H)
[$10000, $200000]
75.7%
54.8 days
63321
(13.22%)
38794
(22.7%)

Very High (VH)
[$200000+]
54.6%
97.4 days
4142
(0.87%)
3417
(2.0%)

Table 5: Average Response Time (LRT) by Cost Categories
are referred to as Data Set 3 in Figure 3. See Cohen et al. (1998) for a detailed analysis of
the data sets including diﬀerent breakdowns and charts.
The transaction data exhibited a wide range of performance characteristics. The overall
ﬁll rate across all parts was 90.6%, quite close to the stated goal of 90%. The mean LRT
for an immediate ﬁll (i.e., orders ﬁlled from stock) was 24 days, whereas the mean LRT for
a delayed ﬁll was 123 days. Table 5 illustrates how ﬁll rate and average LRT vary with part
cost. We developed these cost categories during our interviews with representatives from
Navy and DLA, based on how the military looks at cost breakdowns while making decisions.
The striking negative relationship between part cost and service performance, (statistically
signiﬁcant at p < 0.01), raises some interesting questions. Is this pattern appropriate or
necessary? Are the underlying causes due to explicit managerial policy or are they a result
of environmental and structural factors beyond the control of system managers?

Table 6 illustrates the relationship between performance and the WSIC codes. One would
expect service to be highest for parts having high essentiality which reside in systems having
high criticality (i.e., parts in the upper left corner of Table 6). Our data conﬁrms this intuition. However, one would also expect service to drop oﬀ as one moves to the right or down
16

System
Criticality
HIGH (H)
Fill Rate
Average LRT (days)
No. of Transactions
No. of Parts
MEDIUM (M)
Fill Rate
Average LRT (days)
No. of Transactions
No. of Parts
LOW (L)
Fill Rate
Average LRT (days)
No. of Transactions
No. of Parts

Very High (VH)

Part Essentiality
High (H)
Medium (M)

Low (L)

92.8%
29.9
320,455 (70.05%)
35971 (47.9%)

70.5%
54.3
14,267 (3.12%)
2617 (3.5%)

84.5%
37.4
18,892 (4.13%)
5390 (7.2%)

79.5%
46.5
27,536 (6.02%)
7603 (10.1%)

90.8%
33.86
38,786 (8.48%)
9346 (12.4%)

77.4%
50.18
3777 (0.83%)
2887 (3.8%)

82.4%
47.0
4228 (0.92%)
1041 (1.4%)

76.6%
55.74
8949 (1.96%)
2140 (2.8%)

88.1%
38.8
17,013 (3.72%)
6191 (8.2%)

90.4%
34.1
407 (0.09%)
177 (0.2%)

80.1%
45.2
1584 (0.35%)
555 (0.7%)

73.0%
54.4
1558 (0.34%)
1196 (1.6%)

Table 6: Average Logistic Response Time (LRT) by Criticality/Essentiality Codes
this matrix. This trend holds true for all essentiality categories except (H). For parts in this
category, service appears to improve as system criticality decreases. This raises the question,
what is diﬀerent about essentiality (H) items? It also raises the more general question, are
these performance level diﬀerences really attributed to a part’s essentiality/criticality rating
or are they driven by diﬀerences in other characteristics of parts within these categories?
For example, do some essentiality/criticality categories have a higher proportion of low cost
parts (which are easier to service)?

In order to develop a better understanding of the complex performance/attribute relationship we computed correlations across key attributes (see Table 7). Most correlations
reported in this table are close to zero and all of them are less than 0.3. The most signiﬁcant
correlations are between essentiality or criticality with demand frequency. It is not surprising that parts classiﬁed most important are used more frequently. It is also interesting to
17

note that both essentiality and weapon criticality are negatively correlated with cost (i.e.,
standard unit price) which, as noted earlier, is strongly negatively correlated with service.
The cost/criticality correlation is much stronger than the cost/essentiality correlation, however. This diﬀerence helps to explain the results observed in Table 6. Parts that are critical
tend to be less expensive and hence will exhibit higher service. The variation of cost with
essentiality is much weaker. Review of the data indicated that the average price for the
four essentiality codes (VH, H, M and L) are $96, $279, $208, and $240 respectively. Thus,
essentiality code H parts are the most expensive and thus we would expect them to have
lower service (as they do in Table 6).

Essentiality

Weapon
Criticality
-0.050***
1.000

Standard Unit
Price
-0.060***
-0.150***

Production
lead-time
-0.080***
-0.050***

Administrative
lead-time
-0.080***
-0.050***

Essentiality
1.000
Weapon
-0.050**
Criticality
Standard
-0.060***
-0.150***
1.000
0.063***
0.033***
Unit Price
Production
-0.080***
-0.050***
0.063***
1.000
0.280***
lead-time
Administrative
-0.080***
-0.050***
0.033***
0.280***
1.000
lead-time
Demand
0.230***
0.260***
-0.010***
-0.060***
-0.020***
Frequency
Note: All correlation coeﬃcients are Pearson correlation coeﬃcients
except for WSIC correlations where we report Spearman Ranked Correlations
*** - Signiﬁcant at p < 0.0001 level.

Demand
Frequency
0.230***
0.260***
-0.010***
-0.060***
-0.020***
1.000

Table 7: Correlation table

We test the signiﬁcance of these relationships more rigorously in the next subsection
through a regression analysis. We use regression analysis to sort out the underlying signiﬁcance of each attribute in explaining the observed variation in service performance, given the
18

complex interactions that exist across the various attribute variables. As we shall see, the
regression analysis can be used to deﬁnitively test hypotheses concerning the relationship of
key attribute variables (i.e., cost, essentiality and criticality) and performance.

3.2

Focus on Cost and Priority

Our interview data from the Navy ICP revealed early on that customers expect a part to be
serviced according to its criticality and essentiality level, irrespective of the part’s cost. The
data in Tables 5 and 6 suggest this may not be the case. Our purpose here is to test the
relationship between these three attributes (cost, criticality, essentiality) and performance
in a more rigorous fashion, controlling for all other part attributes. Speciﬁcally, we set out
to test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Part cost does not aﬀect performance.
Hypothesis 2 Mission Criticality Code does not aﬀect performance.
Hypothesis 3 Part Essentiality Code does not aﬀect performance.
The customers’ view of how DLA’s system should operate, given its mission to support
system readiness in a cost-eﬀective manner, is that Hypothesis 1 is true and Hypotheses 2
and 3 are false.
To test these hypotheses, we regressed Logistic Response Time (LRT), against the candidate performance drivers listed in Table 3. Similar regressions were also performed using
Fill Rate as the dependent variable. Results from those regressions are similar and therefore not reported here. We introduced a series of indicator variables to depict our ordinal
attributes, Part Essentiality (ES) and Weapon Criticality (WC), as well as our categorization of Standard Unit Price (SUP) as listed in Table 6. These variables are set to 1 if the
19

part lies in that particular category and 0 otherwise. These variables include SUPi , i = vh
(very high), h (high), m (medium), l (low); W Cj , j = h (high), m (medium); ESk , k = vh
(very high), h (high), m (medium). The ﬁrst (low) category is the default category, and not
included as an indicator variable. We also used second order interactions between these indicator variables to test the signiﬁcance of all possible pairwise combinations of attributes in
order to isolate the primary eﬀect of each individual attribute variable. The ﬁnal regression
is then
LRT = α +


i=costgroups

β1,i SUPi +


j=crit.groups

β2,j W Cj +


k=ESgroups

+β5 P LT + β6 P C + β7 AD + β8 DF + β9 AJ + β10 AZ +
+





k=ESgroups j=crit.groups

β12,k,j +





i=costgroups j=crit.groups

+ second order terms.

β3k ESk + β4 ALT




i=costgroups k=ESgroups

β11,i,k

β13,i,j
(1)

In keeping with customers expectations, if Hypothesis 1 is true than the β1i ’s in our regression
should be insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, if Hypotheses 2 and 3 are false, the β2j ’s and
β3k ’s should be signiﬁcant.
We summarize the results in Table 8 for both a normal ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression and a rank regression. The OLS regression uses the absolute value of LRT for the
regression, while the ranked regression uses the percentile score of the LRT as the dependent
variable. Thus the rank regression results in a rescaling of the dependent variable, which
can result in a change in the estimated slopes for the two regressions. Our hypothesis
tests are based on the statistical signiﬁcance of the independent variables and not on the
magnitude of the coeﬃcients in the regression. As long as the independent variable shows
statistical signiﬁcance in both the regressions, we conclude that the two models agree. These
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Coeﬃcient
Variable
Estimates
Name
α
Intercept
β1,vh
SU Pvh
β1,h
SU Ph
β1,m
SU Pm
β1,l
SU Pl
β2,vh
ESvh
β2,h
ESh
β2,m
ESm
β3,h
W Ch
β3,m
W Cm
β4
ALT
β5
P LT
β6
PC
β7
AD
β8
DF
β9
AJ
β10
AZ
β11,l,vh
SU Pl *ESvh
β11,l,h
SU Pl ∗ ESh
β11,l,m
SU Pl ∗ ESm
β11,m,vh
SU Pm ∗ ESvh
β11,m,h
SU Pm ∗ ESh
β11,m,m
SU Pm ∗ ESm
β11,h,vh
SU Ph ∗ ESvh
β11,h,h
SU Ph ∗ ESh
β11,h,m
SU Ph ∗ ESm
β11,vh,vh
SU Pvh ∗ ESvh
β11,vh,h
SU Pvh ∗ ESh
β11,vh,m
SU Pvh ∗ ESm
β11,vh,h
ESvh ∗ W Ch
β12,vh,m
ESvh ∗ W Cm
β12,h,h
ESh ∗ W Ch
β12,h,m
ESh ∗ W Cm
β12,m,h
ESm ∗ W Bh
β12,m,m
ESm ∗ W Cm
β13,l,h
SU Pl ∗ W Ch
β13,l,m
SU Pl ∗ W Cm
β13,m,h
SU Pm ∗ W Ch
β13,m,m
SU Pm ∗ W Cm
β13,h,h
SU Ph ∗ W Bh
β13,h,m
SU Ph ∗ W Cm
β13,vh,h
SU Pvh ∗ W Bh
β13,vh,m
SU Pvh ∗ W Cm
Observations
N
F Statistics
Adjusted R2
*Signiﬁcant at p < 0.1 level
**Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05 level
***Signiﬁcant at p < 0.0001 level

OLS
Regression
21.770***
56.350***
22.250***
9.330***
-1.040*
3.220
0.100
-2.500
0.150
-2.250
0.023***
0.017***
-0.038***
0.000*
0.007***
66.810***
4.130***
5.680
-7.920
4.010
-4.230
16.030*
1.060*
5.120*
-14.460
6.030
7.160
-34.950
5.210
2.600
23.90*
8.780*
21.240*
-3.350
2.010
5.310*
6.750**
-3.350
2.010
8.780***
21.240***
2.60**
23.90***
457,552
374.940***
0.095

Rank
Regression
47.320***
23.260***
14.430***
8.030***
-0.590*
5.302
-4.710
-1.420
-0.480
-0.350**
-0.006***
-0.005***
-0.017***
0.000*
0.005***
21.040***
-0.891***
2.310
-10.230**
1.400
-6.250
5.620
-2.920*
4.590*
-10.580**
1.810
10.230*
-25.650
4.540
-1.350
0.860
10.350*
1.860
-3.030**
3.850**
1.680
3.510**
-8.160**
-1.720
8.150***
1.140**
12.850*
3.460**
457,552
165.250***
0.043

Table 8: Results of regression analysis for Logistics Response Time
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two separate regressions were performed to control for any functional relationship between
response time and the independent variables. The adjusted R2 value for the OLS and rank
regressions was 0.095 and 0.043, respectively, with the F statistics for both models signiﬁcant
at p < 0.0001. Note that given the complex nature of the military environment, it is diﬃcult
to model a precise relationship between the response time and part attribute variables,
resulting in a low R2 value. We therefore used a large sample size to identify these eﬀects with
suﬃcient precision. The F statistics for the model and most variables is signiﬁcant to a high
degree (p < 0.0001). We used various methods such as Ordinary Least Squares Regression,
Rank Regression, distribution plots etc., and in each case observed similar results regarding
the impact of standard unit price, criticality and essentiality codes on performance. Hence,
we conclude that our results are robust to any functional relationship between response time
and the independent variables. See Hitt and Frei 1999, for a similar justiﬁcation.
The results indicate that Standard Unit Price is signiﬁcant at the p < 0.0001 level,
refuting Hypothesis 1. To further investigate the direction of this relationship, we conducted
Tukey-Kramer and Scheﬀe tests for pairwise comparisons of means between the cost groups.
All pairwise comparisons were signiﬁcant at p < 0.0001 level, refuting the hypothesis β1,vh ≤
β1,h ≤ β1,m ≤ β1,l . This suggests that, all else being equal, response time increases with cost
categories from ‘Low’ to ‘Very High’.
On the other hand, the coeﬃcients for essentiality and criticality codes are not generally
signiﬁcant, providing support for Hypotheses 2 and 3. Only essentiality code ‘M’ showed
any signiﬁcance (p < 0.05) and only within the rank regression model. We also were not able
to detect a signiﬁcant directional relationship using the Tukey-Kramer and Scheﬀe tests. In
particular, we could not reject the hypotheses β2,vh ≤ β2,h ≤ β2,m , and β3,h ≤ β3,m .
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The fact that essentiality and criticality do not exhibit a signiﬁcant positive relationship
with response time may seem, at ﬁrst, contradictory with the trend observed in Table 6.
However, what the regression has done is shown that once one controls for other part attribute
diﬀerences (especially cost), the impact of priority codes seems to disappear. We did not
see this subtle point when aggregating parts within priority categories in Table 6. The
regression suggests that the partial consistency of performance with respect to essentiality
and criticality codes seen in Table 6 is due to the part composition within criticality and
essentiality categories rather than the category itself.
It is worth noting that most of our other control variables, including production and
administrative lead-times, part commonality, demand frequency, and acquisition codes were
also signiﬁcant in the regression model. Acquisition code J, in particular, exhibits a large positive relationship with response time. Recall that acquisition code J items are, by deﬁnition,
not-stocked and hence should experience longer response times when demand ﬁnally comes
in for these items. Finally, a large number of interaction terms came out to be insigniﬁcant
in our regression model. We did not observe any conclusive trend for these terms.

4

Managing Service Categories: Descriptive and Prescriptive Models

Our analysis of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 suggests a disconnect between the expectations of the
Navy ICP and the actual performance provided by DLA. However, it is premature to claim
that DLA completely ignores priority codes and bases its inventory stocking decisions solely
on cost. Here we introduce a descriptive model to show how stocking decisions would be
made if cost were the primary driver. While this model is quite simple, it captures the basic
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tradeoﬀs DLA considers when setting inventory levels across product groups. After comparing this model with DLA’s observed behavior, we introduce a normative model designed to
better align the objectives of DLA and its customers.

4.1

A Descriptive Model

We conjecture that DLA sets its stocking levels with the objective of minimizing its aggregate
inventory investment across all parts, subject to meeting an aggregate ﬁll rate constraint.
The following model tests this conjecture by showing how our sample service parts would be
supported under this objective. We make the following model assumptions to simplify our
analysis while keeping true to DLA’s environment. First, we assume demand for each part
i follows a Poisson process with an annual demand rate of λi units per year (λ =

N

i=1

λi ),

which is a reasonable assumption given the low rate of demand for these service parts. We
also assume a (Q, r) replenishment policy for all parts (i.e., DLA places an order of size Q
for a part whenever its inventory position falls below r) with a ﬁxed replenishment lead-time
τ . DLA’s major costs include a holding cost, incurred at a rate h for all inventory held
on-hand, and a setup/transaction cost, charged as k for each replenishment order placed.
DLA’s stocking problem is then,
min

N


hci (ri − µi +

i=1

Qi 1
λi
+ + Bi (ri , Qi )) + k
2
2
Qi

(2)

Subject to:
N


λi
(1 − Ai (ri , Qi )) ≥ β
i=1 λ

Where:
i - index for parts, i = 1, . . . , N.
ci - unit cost for part i.
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(3)

ri - reorder level for part i.
Qi - order quantity for part i.
µi - mean lead time demand for part i.
Bi (ri , Qi ) - average expected backorders for part i.
Ai (ri , Qi ) - long run probability of stockout for part i.
λi - annual demand rate for item i.
β - aggregate ﬁll rate target.
The model is similar to one proposed by Hopp, Spearman, and Zhang (1997). Here the
order quantity and reorder levels are functions of the aggregate ﬁll rate target, as well as
part cost, replenishment lead-time, and part demand rate. We note that multi-echelon and
dynamic complexities are ignored in this model. Its purpose is to illustrate the basic tradeoﬀ
between reducing inventory costs and meeting the aggregate service target.
We wish to compare this model’s performance against the actual performance revealed by
our data. If the performances are similar, this would give further credence to the conjecture
that DLA is focusing primarily on cost and aggregate performance, rather than the tailored
performance of essentiality and criticality categories. To simplify the analysis, we aggregate
our data (of 170,000 parts) into 12 groups with common essentiality and criticality codes. So
instead of solving the model with 170,000 parts we aggregate them into 12 groups according
to WSIC codes A through L (see Table 1) and use attribute averages within each group
to characterize a ‘typical’ part. Although this is a very aggregate simpliﬁcation of our
data, it helps us solve the model eﬃciently while still drawing insights about the tradeoﬀs
involved. In the real problem, each part will have its own service level and cost based on its
individual characteristics. One can leverage these diﬀerences by allowing some ﬂexibility in
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how service is allocated to parts within a category, while still meeting that category’s overall
service requirement. Since our aggregate model has less ﬂexibility in diﬀerentiating service
levels for parts based on their individual characteristics, we believe it is conservative (i.e.,
overestimates cost and underestimates service) relative to the real problem.
System
Criticality Code
actual observed
descriptive model
High
prescriptive model
actual observed
descriptive model Medium
prescriptive model
actual observed
descriptive model
Low
prescriptive model

Part Essentiality Code
Very High High Medium Low
93%
71%
85%
80%
94%
74%
76%
56%
93%
90%
87%
84%
91%
77%
82%
77%
88%
82%
76%
65%
87%
84%
81%
78%
88%
90%
80%
73%
82%
87%
67%
61%
84%
81%
78%
75%

Table 9: Comparison of Observed Fill Rates and Fill Rates for Descriptive and Prescriptive
Models across Essentiality/Criticality Codes

Table 9 shows the predicted ﬁll rates from our descriptive model and the actual observed
ﬁll rates across the 12 WSIC categories. Here we used an aggregate service level constraint
of 91% to match the actual aggregate service observed in the data study, a h value based
on a 24% annual holding cost rate, and a k of $50. For each WSIC category, the observed
ﬁll rate is stated on the top followed by the ﬁll rate dictated by this ‘aggregate model’ just
below. For example, the observed ﬁll rate for the most critical WSIC code is 93% while its
predicted value (based on our descriptive model) is 94%. The estimated annual cost of our
descriptive model is $26.1 million, while the estimated cost of the current policy based on
observed ﬁll rates is $27.3 million.
Table 9 oﬀers two interesting observations concerning the impact of criticality and essentiality codes on ﬁll rates. First, the ﬁll rate trend across priority categories is similar
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for the predicted and observed data. To see this more clearly, consider the sign of ﬁll rate
changes for adjacent criticality and essentiality categories. For example, in the ﬁrst row of
the table both the predicted and observed ﬁll rates decrease as one moves from Very High
to High essentiality. There are 17 such sign comparisons in the table. The predicted and
observed ﬁll rates follow the same sign change in 14 of the possible 17 comparisons. This
consistency is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.01), using a binomial test. Our model therefore
appears reasonably consistent in predicting DLA’s relative behavior across criticality and
essentiality codes. It is interesting to note that in the three cases where the sign changes in
observed ﬁllrates do not match with our model, relative part cost appears to play a dominant
role. For example, for low essentiality code items, the unit cost is slightly higher for high
criticality items than for medium criticality items. Since our model minimizes cost, for low
essentiality items, it prescribes a higher ﬁllrate for medium criticality items than for high
criticality items, contrary to the observed ﬁllrates.

Our second observation is that the aggregate model predicts a much larger spread of ﬁll
rate values. It is interesting that a model which ignores criticality and essentiality codes
altogether actually oﬀers a wider discrepancy of performance. For example, the ﬁll rate
spread between the highest and lowest priority categories is (94%, 61%) for the model versus
the observed (93%, 73%). This suggests that DLA is not setting stocking levels solely on
aggregate measures, but is also sensitive not to let the ﬁll rates of any one part category
deteriorate below an acceptable bound. Our discussions with DLA support this suggestion.
In the next section we oﬀer a model to help capture this bounding behavior as well as improve
DLA’s ability to directly diﬀerentiate across priority codes.
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4.2

A Prescriptive Model

There are several ways DLA could better align its service parts performance with customer
expectations. The most obvious is to oﬀer tailored ﬁll rates based on individual WSIC codes.
One way to do this is by adding the following constraints to the model.

(1 − Ai (ri , Qi )) ≥ βi

i = 1, . . . , 12

(4)

where βi > βj , if category i is more critical than category j.
For illustrative purposes, we ran this new “tailored” prescriptive model with the βi ’s set
to 93% for the highest criticality category (β1 ) and 75% for the lowest criticality category
(β12 ), with a uniform slope for the criticality categories in between. These values reﬂect
the military’s desired maximum and minimum service levels across the priority categories.
Keeping the aggregate ﬁll rate target ﬁxed at 91%, this tailored model estimated an inventory
cost of $27.27 million which is actually slightly less than the estimated cost of the current
observed performance (but about 4% larger than the cost of the descriptive model without
individual ﬁll rate constraints). This is promising since it suggests we may be able to
support a strategy of setting service levels consistent with part priority with little (or no)
deterioration in cost or aggregate ﬁll rate. Table 9 provides a comparison of the ﬁll rates
from the descriptive and prescriptive models. The prescriptive model oﬀers a tighter spread
between its maximum and minimum service levels (since this was desired by the military)
as well as better consistency within each priority category.
Table 9 also provides a comparison of the ﬁll rates from our prescriptive model and the
observed ﬁll rates in practice (rows 1 and 3 of each category). An examination of this table
reveals that our model increases the service provided to some of the high criticality part
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categories (e.g. high essentiality and high criticality code) and reduces the service level of
some low criticality code part categories (e.g. low criticality high essentiality code). Our
model increases the service level of 6 categories (most of which have high criticality) while
reducing the service level for 5 categories (with lower criticality). Thus by rebalancing ﬁll
rates across these categories, a more consistent service level performance can be achieved
without a signiﬁcant increase in cost or deterioration of the aggregate ﬁll rate.
These results are obviously driven by the military’s choice of maximum and minimum
service level targets. In general, one would like a more systematic method for setting service
targets (i.e., the βi ’s) which allowed one to examine the cost and service trade-oﬀs of diﬀerent
alternatives. Note that in some environments, the allocation of parts or products to priority
categories may also be an issue. This is not the case for the military since they have explicit
rules for assigning priority codes to parts. A part essentiality code is usually based on an
assessment of possible consequences of a part failure to the operation of the weapon system.
Thus part essentiality code is usually based on engineering and other technical speciﬁcations.
The essentiality and criticality codes are assigned to parts with the notion that parts with
higher priority get better service.
One simple method for setting service targets is to ﬁrst specify a minimum target for the
lowest criticality category and then choose a uniform diﬀerence ∆ for service levels between
consecutive priority categories. For example, let the service level target for the least critical
category be βmin , then the service level target for the next higher criticality category would
be βmin + ∆, and for the next higher category would be βmin + 2∆, and so on. We can
solve the constrained service level optimization problem given by (2), (3) and (4) initially
by setting ∆ = 0 and estimating a lower bound on the inventory cost. We then resolve the
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problem by gradually increasing ∆ and estimating the new inventory cost. We repeat this
process until the increased inventory cost meets the current budget. We brieﬂy illustrate
this procedure using our data.
We ﬁrst classiﬁed three priority categories by using the WSIC codes given in Table 1.
Category 1 denotes the highest priority level and consists of WSIC codes A, B and E.
Category 3 is the lowest priority level and consists of WSIC codes H, K and L. All other
WSIC codes fall in category 2. This classiﬁcation is based on what DLA has proposed to
implement in the future (a policy change inﬂuenced by our analysis in this study). We set a
service level target of βmin = 80% for the third category , βmin + ∆ for the second category
and βmin + 2∆ for category 1. We set ∆ = 0 initially and solve the optimization problem (2),
(3) and (4) resulting in a estimated cost of $21 million. The ∆ is increased gradually until
the model gave an estimated cost of $27.3 million (the current estimated cost as discussed
earlier) at ∆ = 5.5%. Thus by accepting a service level of 80% for the category 3 parts, the
service level target for the highest category parts could be increased to 91% and also have an
estimated cost within the current expenditure of $27.3 million. DLA is currently proposing
to move in a similar direction by setting service level targets of 84%, 86% and 88% for the
three criticality categories. They will now allocate inventory based on the part cost and the
explicit service level associated with that part’s priority category.
Another possible approach is to start with a service level target for the highest category
and let the model optimize over the two lower service categories while maintaining a given
budget target. To illustrate, we set the target for the highest service category at 95%,
implying service level targets of 95%, 95%- ∆, and 95% - 2∆ for the three categories. Setting
the budget constraint to our current budget of $27.3 million, we found an optimal ∆ of 15%.
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Figure 4: Tradeoﬀ curve for βmax versus βmin
Thus we would have to accept a service level of 65% on the lowest category to achieve a
95% ﬁll rate for the highest category, while remaining within the budget. This indicates that
the service levels are highly sensitive to the ﬁll rates of the highest service category. As we
increase the target for the highest service category we either have to accept reduced service
levels for the lower criticality categories or have to increase the budget. This tradeoﬀ between
βmax versus βmin is shown in Figure 4. This ﬁgure shows that for very high target service
levels for the highest category we may have to accept signiﬁcant decrease in the service level
for the low criticality categories if the budget is ﬁxed. If the budget is increased, then the
trade-oﬀ is less severe.
We would like to emphasize that these are not the only ways of setting service level
targets, and indeed one could formulate this as a constrained optimization problem (see
Deshpande et al. 2001). We have simply outlined two reasonable methods which appear
to work well for the military. The basic idea is to set a service level target for one priority
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category and then adjust the remaining targets relative to that benchmark. The critical point
is that as management becomes more willing to accept a lower service level for the lowest
criticality category, they can achieve higher service level targets for the highest criticality
category, without signiﬁcant increase in overall costs.

5

Conclusion

This paper reported on the role of priority codes in the military service parts system and the
impact of these codes on performance. The military logistics system uses an explicit method
for assigning criticality and essentiality codes to service parts. We conducted a rigorous
analysis of the impact of these priority codes on performance measures such as the logistics
response time in the system. Our analysis showed that due to the cost minimization objectives of the DLA under aggregate service level constraints, part cost is a signiﬁcant driver of
performance, whereas priority codes do not have the expected impact on performance. We
constructed a descriptive inventory model to explain the trade-oﬀ between cost and service
and recommend the use of explicit service level constraints based on priority categories to
obtain performance consistent with the priority codes assigned to parts. We outlined two
practical methods for assigning service level targets to diﬀerent priority categories.
This empirical study oﬀers a number of lessons for inventory managers in other (nonmilitary) settings. In the commercial world, competitive success depends on customer satisfaction, of which after sales service is a key component. Many commercial companies provide
after sales service using a complex multi-echelon network, stocking thousands of service parts.
The consequences of a failure of a part to the operation of the end-product are not similar
across all parts. Some parts are more critical to the operation of the end-product than others.
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This paper shows the beneﬁts of classifying parts into diﬀerent priority categories based on
service. Speciﬁcally, by classifying parts based on priority categories, the right level of service
can be provided to each service category. Also, by accepting lower service levels for lower
priority categories, high service levels can be provided for high priority categories without a
signiﬁcant increase in inventory cost. The traditional ABC classiﬁcation of parts is based on
part cost or part volume or a combination of both such as dollar volume. Our analysis sheds
light on a customer-centric approach of classiﬁcation of parts based on service requirements.
Such a classiﬁcation is particularly useful in managing after-sales service systems.
Our empirical ﬁndings for the DLA suggest that if the categorization of parts based
on service is done based on explicit service level targets, then the diﬀerentiated service
requirements can be met without a substantial increase in inventory costs. Classiﬁcation of
parts based on service requirement helps in achieving higher levels of service for the highly
critical parts without a signiﬁcant increase in overall costs. However, this classiﬁcation has
to be done in the following fashion. First, all parts must be properly classiﬁed according
to priority based on the consequence to the operation of the end-product due to the part
failure. Next, explicit service level targets should be set for each priority category.
The use of priority categories also opens up a number of interesting open research questions. For example, in this paper, we assumed a (Q, r) inventory policy was used for managing
service parts inventory. The parameters for the inventory policy were set based on the ﬁll
rate target used for the priority category corresponding to the service part. The implicit
assumption behind this approach is that all users of a service part assign the same priority
category to that part. However, as noted in Table 6, we observed that it is quite common
for diﬀerent users of a speciﬁc service part to assign it diﬀerent priority categories. For
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example, the central agency may be supplying a common part to two customers: one with
a high service requirement and the other with a low service requirement. Each customer
may assign a diﬀerent priority category to the same common part. The challenge for the
central agency then is to be able to achieve the beneﬁts of pooling across these heterogenous
customer classes, but at the same time provide them the diﬀerentiated service according
to their requirements. Deshpande et al. (1998) analyze this rationing question in detail for
a continuous review system, while Frank et al. (1999) analyze a similar problem with two
priority classes for a periodic review system.
Service part categories based on service prioritization can also lead to incentive problems
in a decentralized system. If parts in higher priority categories have better service then there
is incentive to give a high criticality classiﬁcation to as many parts as possible. During our
ﬁeld study we observed that the central agency was charging a ﬁxed price to its customers
independent of the service requirement required by the customer for that part. In such
an environment, the ICPs could (in theory) inﬂate a part’s priority ranking with no direct
monetary consequences. The military is now exploring ways to encourage individuals in their
decentralized system to assign the correct priority category, and associated service level, to
each part. Deshpande et al. (2000) provide an initial analysis of this incentive problem.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported in part by the U.S. Navy under Contract # NOV391-96-M-M04,
NSF CAREER Award #9602072, NSF grant #0075391, and the Fishman-Davidson Center
for Service Operations Management at the Wharton School. Special thanks to the following
people from various organizations within the military - Sandy Leggieri, Gary Burchill, Jere
34

Engelman, and Mike Puoy. The authors also acknowledge the detailed comments of Alan
Washburn and two anonymous referees on earlier versions of this paper.

References
Cohen, M. A., K. Donohue, and V. Deshpande. 1998. Supply Chain Coordination Study:
U.S. Navy / Defense Logistics Agency. Project Report, Fishman-Davidson Center for Service and Operations Management, The Wharton School, Philadelphia.

Cohen, M. A., Kamesan, P., Kleindorfer, P. R., and Lee, H. L. 1990. OPTIMIZER: A MultiEchelon Inventory System for Service Logistics Management. Interfaces, 20(1), 65-82.

Cohen, M. A., P. R. Kleindorfer, and H. L Lee. 1986. Optimal Stocking Policies for Low
Usage Items in Multi-Echelon Inventory Systems. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 33,
17-38.

Cohen, M. A., P. R. Kleindorfer, and H. L Lee. 1988. Service Constrained (s, S) Inventory
Systems with Priority Demand Classes and Lost Sales. Management Science, 34(4), 482-499.

Cohen, M. A., P. R. Kleindorfer, and H. L Lee. 1989. Near Optimal Service Constrained
Stocking Policies for Spare Parts. Operations Research, 37, 104-117.

Cohen, M. A., and Lee, H. L. 1988. Strategic Analysis of Integrated Production-Distribution
Systems: Models and Methods. Operations Research, 36, 216-228.

35

Cohen, M. A., and Lee, H. L. 1990. Out of Touch with Customer Needs? Spare Parts and
After Sales Service. Sloan Management Review, Winter, 55-66.

Cohen, M. A., and Zhang, S. 1997. Benchmarking Service Parts Logistics: An In-Depth
Analysis. Working Paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

Deshpande, V., Cohen, M. A., Donohue, K. 2001. A Threshold Inventory Rationing Policy
for Service Diﬀerentiated Demand Classes. Working Paper, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, August.

Deshpande, V., Cohen, M. A., Donohue, K. 2000. Incentive Compatible Pricing Mechanisms
for Service Diﬀerentiated Supply Chains. Working Paper, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania, August.

Deshpande, V. 2000. Supply Chain Coordination with Service Diﬀerentiated Customer
Classes. unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
August.

Deuermeyer, B., and Schwarz, L. B. 1981. A Model for the Analysis of System Service Level
in Warehouse/Retailer Distribution Systems: The Identical Retailer Case.in Schwarz, L.
B.(ed.), Multi-Level Production/Inventory Control Systems, TIMS Studies in Management
Science, 16, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 163-193.

36

Frank, K., Zhang, R. Q., and Duenyas, I., 1999. Optimal Inventory Policies in Systems with
Priority Demand Classes, under revision with Operations Research.

Graves, S.C. 1985. A Multi-Echelon Inventory Model for a Repairable Item with One-forOne Replenishment. Management Science, 31, 1247-1256.

Hitt, L. M., and Frei, F. X. 1999. Do Better Customers Utilize Electronic Distribution
Channels? The Case of PC Banking. Working Paper, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, April

Hopp, W. J., Spearman, M. L., and Zhang, R. Q. 1997. Easily Implementable Inventory
Control Policies, Operations Research, 45, 327-340.

Lee, H.L. 1987. A Multi-Echelon Inventory Model for Repairable Items with Emergency
Lateral Transhipments. Management Science, 33, 1306-1316.

Lee, H., and Billington, C. 1993. Material Management in Decentralized Supply Chains.
Operations Research, 41(5), 835-847.

Muckstatdt, J. A., and Thomas, L. J. 1980. Are Multi-Echelon Inventory Methods Worth
Implementing in Systems with Low Demand Rates?. Management Science, 26, 483-494.

Rustenburg, W. D., vanHoutum, G. J., and Zijm, W. H. Oct 2000. Spare parts management
37

for technical systems: Resupply of spare parts under limited budgets. IIE Transactions,
(32), 1013-1026.

Sherbrooke, C. C. 1968. METRIC: A Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control. Operations Research, (16), 122-141.

Simon, R.M. 1971. Stationary Properties of a Two-Echelon Inventory Model for Low Demand Items. Operations Research, 19, 761-777.

Wang, Y., Cohen, M.A. and Zheng, Y, S. 1999. Identifying Opportunities for Improving
Teradyne’s Service Parts Logistics System. Interfaces, (29), 1-18.

Wang, Y., Cohen, M.A. and Zheng, Y, S. 2000. A Two-Echelon Repairable Inventory
System with Local-Center Dependent Depot Replenishment Lead Times. Management Science, (49), 1441-1453.

Wang, Y., Cohen, M.A. and Zheng, Y, S. 2001. Diﬀerentiating Parts Replacement Service
on the Basis of Delivery Lead-Times. Forthcoming, IIE Transactions.

38
All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.

